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Marxist Revolution of the West

June 30, 2007 4 comments

Marxist Revolution of the West

by Reginald Firehammer

http://theautonomist.com/aaphp/revolution/revolution1.html

A little more than 230 years ago, the most important, significant, and profound revolution in the history of the world occurred, a revolution based on a single concept, individual liberty. The result of that revolution was the creation of the most prosperous, free, and cultured country the world has ever known. That revolution was the American revolution.

About 70 years ago, seven men planned another revolution, completely unlike the American revolution. It would not be “political” and would not be carried out by means of violence or war as the American and all other political revolutions have been, because the ambitions of those men were much higher than the mere replacing of one political system with another. They were aiming at nothing short of a world-wide revolution that would entirely change the minds of men, replacing all of Western Civilization with a new “cultural paradigm” that would usher in a word-wide totalitarian utopian state.

Most of the world has never heard of this revolution, and more significantly, most people are unaware that it has thus far been completely successful. The world-wide totalitarian state is already in the wings and about to makes its entrance, and when it does, it will be enthusiastically embraced, because the concepts that made Western civilization possible have been completely replaced in the minds of men, even in America, and no one notices or even understands what it is that has been lost.

The Second American Revolution

Unless you have lived in the United States over sixty years, it will be almost impossible for you to see or believe the extent of the changes in American society and culture since the end of the 50s, changes so profound they constitute a second American Revolution. The first revolution brought the highest levels of individual integrity, freedom, prosperity, cultural achievement, and happiness ever seen in this world, the second revolution has produced a culture dominated by vice, crime, squalor, misery, an accelerating deterioration of every value and principle the first American Revolution was about, and most importantly, the almost total loss of individual freedom. The fact that most people believe they are “free” and love the culture and society that now dominates America is evidence of the success of that second revolution. One of the seven men that spawned that revolution, Antonio Gramsci, predicted that using the media, education, and, “mass psychology,” men would learn to “love their servitude,” indeed, would not even recognize that it is servitude.

Marxism is Very Much Alive and Well

There is a common mistaken view held by a great many in the West, that since the collapse of the USSR and the end of the “cold war” socialism, particularly Marxist socialism, is no longer a viable threat. This is an enormous mistake that could only be made by academics, and other assorted pseudo-intellectuals, totally isolated from the actual history of the last 70 years or of current events. Consider these recent news items:

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A Failure In Generalship

June 29, 2007 3 comments

A failure in generalship
By Lt. Col. Paul Yingling
for the Armed Forces Journal

“You officers amuse yourselves with God knows what buffooneries and never dream in the least of serious service. This is a source of stupidity which would become most dangerous in case of a serious conflict.” — Frederick the Great

For the second time in a generation, the United States faces the prospect of defeat at the hands of an insurgency. In April 1975, the U.S. fled the Republic of Vietnam, abandoning our allies to their fate at the hands of North Vietnamese communists. In 2007, Iraq’s grave and deteriorating condition offers diminishing hope for an American victory and portends risk of an even wider and more destructive regional war.

These debacles are not attributable to individual failures, but rather to a crisis in an entire institution: America’s general officer corps. America’s generals have failed to prepare our armed forces for war and advise civilian authorities on the application of force to achieve the aims of policy. The argument that follows consists of three elements. First, generals have a responsibility to society to provide policymakers with a correct estimate of strategic probabilities. Second, America’s generals in Vietnam and Iraq failed to perform this responsibility. Third, remedying the crisis in American generalship requires the intervention of Congress.

The Responsibilities of Generalship

Armies do not fight wars; nations fight wars. War is not a military activity conducted by soldiers, but rather a social activity that involves entire nations. Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz noted that passion, probability and policy each play their role in war. Any understanding of war that ignores one of these elements is fundamentally flawed.

The passion of the people is necessary to endure the sacrifices inherent in war. Regardless of the system of government, the people supply the blood and treasure required to prosecute war. The statesman must stir these passions to a level commensurate with the popular sacrifices required. When the ends of policy are small, the statesman can prosecute a conflict without asking the public for great sacrifice. Global conflicts such as World War II require the full mobilization of entire societies to provide the men and materiel necessary for the successful prosecution of war. The greatest error the statesman can make is to commit his nation to a great conflict without mobilizing popular passions to a level commensurate with the stakes of the conflict.

Popular passions are necessary for the successful prosecution of war, but cannot be sufficient. To prevail, generals must provide policymakers and the public with a correct estimation of strategic probabilities. The general is responsible for estimating the likelihood of success in applying force to achieve the aims of policy. The general describes both the means necessary for the successful prosecution of war and the ways in which the nation will employ those means. If the policymaker desires ends for which the means he provides are insufficient, the general is responsible for advising the statesman of this incongruence. The statesman must then scale back the ends of policy or mobilize popular passions to provide greater means. If the general remains silent while the statesman commits a nation to war with insufficient means, he shares culpability for the results.

However much it is influenced by passion and probability, war is ultimately an instrument of policy and its conduct is the responsibility of policymakers. War is a social activity undertaken on behalf of the nation; Augustine counsels us that the only purpose of war is to achieve a better peace. The choice of making war to achieve a better peace is inherently a value judgment in which the statesman must decide those interests and beliefs worth killing and dying for. The military man is no better qualified than the common citizen to make such judgments. He must therefore confine his input to his area of expertise — the estimation of strategic probabilities.

The correct estimation of strategic possibilities can be further subdivided into the preparation for war and the conduct of war. Preparation for war consists in the raising, arming, equipping and training of forces. The conduct of war consists of both planning for the use of those forces and directing those forces in operations.

To prepare forces for war, the general must visualize the conditions of future combat. To raise military forces properly, the general must visualize the quality and quantity of forces needed in the next war. To arm and equip military forces properly, the general must visualize the materiel requirements of future engagements. To train military forces properly, the general must visualize the human demands on future battlefields, and replicate those conditions in peacetime exercises. Of course, not even the most skilled general can visualize precisely how future wars will be fought. According to British military historian and soldier Sir Michael Howard, “In structuring and preparing an army for war, you can be clear that you will not get it precisely right, but the important thing is not to be too far wrong, so that you can put it right quickly.”

The most tragic error a general can make is to assume without much reflection that wars of the future will look much like wars of the past. Following World War I, French generals committed this error, assuming that the next war would involve static battles dominated by firepower and fixed fortifications. Throughout the interwar years, French generals raised, equipped, armed and trained the French military to fight the last war. In stark contrast, German generals spent the interwar years attempting to break the stalemate created by firepower and fortifications. They developed a new form of war — the blitzkrieg — that integrated mobility, firepower and decentralized tactics. The German Army did not get this new form of warfare precisely right. After the 1939 conquest of Poland, the German Army undertook a critical self-examination of its operations. However, German generals did not get it too far wrong either, and in less than a year had adapted their tactics for the invasion of France.

After visualizing the conditions of future combat, the general is responsible for explaining to civilian policymakers the demands of future combat and the risks entailed in failing to meet those demands. Civilian policymakers have neither the expertise nor the inclination to think deeply about strategic probabilities in the distant future. Policymakers, especially elected representatives, face powerful incentives to focus on near-term challenges that are of immediate concern to the public. Generating military capability is the labor of decades. If the general waits until the public and its elected representatives are immediately concerned with national security threats before finding his voice, he has waited too long. The general who speaks too loudly of preparing for war while the nation is at peace places at risk his position and status. However, the general who speaks too softly places at risk the security of his country.

Failing to visualize future battlefields represents a lapse in professional competence, but seeing those fields clearly and saying nothing is an even more serious lapse in professional character. Moral courage is often inversely proportional to popularity and this observation in nowhere more true than in the profession of arms. The history of military innovation is littered with the truncated careers of reformers who saw gathering threats clearly and advocated change boldly. A military professional must possess both the physical courage to face the hazards of battle and the moral courage to withstand the barbs of public scorn. On and off the battlefield, courage is the first characteristic of generalship.

Failures of Generalship in Vietnam

America’s defeat in Vietnam is the most egregious failure in the history of American arms. America’s general officer corps refused to prepare the Army to fight unconventional wars, despite ample indications that such preparations were in order. Having failed to prepare for such wars, America’s generals sent our forces into battle without a coherent plan for victory. Unprepared for war and lacking a coherent strategy, America lost the war and the lives of more than 58,000 service members.

Following World War II, there were ample indicators that America’s enemies would turn to insurgency to negate our advantages in firepower and mobility. The French experiences in Indochina and Algeria offered object lessons to Western armies facing unconventional foes. These lessons were not lost on the more astute members of America’s political class. In 1961, President Kennedy warned of “another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin — war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat, by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by evading and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him.” In response to these threats, Kennedy undertook a comprehensive program to prepare America’s armed forces for counterinsurgency.

Despite the experience of their allies and the urging of their president, America’s generals failed to prepare their forces for counterinsurgency. Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Decker assured his young president, “Any good soldier can handle guerrillas.” Despite Kennedy’s guidance to the contrary, the Army viewed the conflict in Vietnam in conventional terms. As late as 1964, Gen. Earle Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated flatly that “the essence of the problem in Vietnam is military.” While the Army made minor organizational adjustments at the urging of the president, the generals clung to what Andrew Krepinevich has called “the Army concept,” a vision of warfare focused on the destruction of the enemy’s forces.

Having failed to visualize accurately the conditions of combat in Vietnam, America’s generals prosecuted the war in conventional terms. The U.S. military embarked on a graduated attrition strategy intended to compel North Vietnam to accept a negotiated peace. The U.S. undertook modest efforts at innovation in Vietnam. Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), spearheaded by the State Department’s “Blowtorch” Bob Kromer, was a serious effort to address the political and economic causes of the insurgency. The Marine Corps’ Combined Action Program (CAP) was an innovative approach to population security. However, these efforts are best described as too little, too late. Innovations such as CORDS and CAP never received the resources necessary to make a large-scale difference. The U.S. military grudgingly accepted these innovations late in the war, after the American public’s commitment to the conflict began to wane.

America’s generals not only failed to develop a strategy for victory in Vietnam, but also remained largely silent while the strategy developed by civilian politicians led to defeat. As H.R. McMaster noted in “Dereliction of Duty,” the Joint Chiefs of Staff were divided by service parochialism and failed to develop a unified and coherent recommendation to the president for prosecuting the war to a successful conclusion. Army Chief of Staff Harold K. Johnson estimated in 1965 that victory would require as many as 700,000 troops for up to five years. Commandant of the Marine Corps Wallace Greene made a similar estimate on troop levels. As President Johnson incrementally escalated the war, neither man made his views known to the president or Congress. President Johnson made a concerted effort to conceal the costs and consequences of Vietnam from the public, but such duplicity required the passive consent of America’s generals.

Having participated in the deception of the American people during the war, the Army chose after the war to deceive itself. In “Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife,” John Nagl argued that instead of learning from defeat, the Army after Vietnam focused its energies on the kind of wars it knew how to win — high-technology conventional wars. An essential contribution to this strategy of denial was the publication of “On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War,” by Col. Harry Summers. Summers, a faculty member of the U.S. Army War College, argued that the Army had erred by not focusing enough on conventional warfare in Vietnam, a lesson the Army was happy to hear. Despite having been recently defeated by an insurgency, the Army slashed training and resources devoted to counterinsurgency.

By the early 1990s, the Army’s focus on conventional war-fighting appeared to have been vindicated. During the 1980s, the U.S. military benefited from the largest peacetime military buildup in the nation’s history. High-technology equipment dramatically increased the mobility and lethality of our ground forces. The Army’s National Training Center honed the Army’s conventional war-fighting skills to a razor’s edge. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 signaled the demise of the Soviet Union and the futility of direct confrontation with the U.S. Despite the fact the U.S. supported insurgencies in Afghanistan, Nicaragua and Angola to hasten the Soviet Union’s demise, the U.S. military gave little thought to counterinsurgency throughout the 1990s. America’s generals assumed without much reflection that the wars of the future would look much like the wars of the past — state-on-state conflicts against conventional forces. America’s swift defeat of the Iraqi Army, the world’s fourth-largest, in 1991 seemed to confirm the wisdom of the U.S. military’s post-Vietnam reforms. But the military learned the wrong lessons from Operation Desert Storm. It continued to prepare for the last war, while its future enemies prepared for a new kind of war.

Failures of Generalship in Iraq

America’s generals have repeated the mistakes of Vietnam in Iraq. First, throughout the 1990s our generals failed to envision the conditions of future combat and prepare their forces accordingly. Second, America’s generals failed to estimate correctly both the means and the ways necessary to achieve the aims of policy prior to beginning the war in Iraq. Finally, America’s generals did not provide Congress and the public with an accurate assessment of the conflict in Iraq.

Despite paying lip service to “transformation” throughout the 1990s, America’s armed forces failed to change in significant ways after the end of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In “The Sling and the Stone,” T.X. Hammes argues that the Defense Department’s transformation strategy focuses almost exclusively on high-technology conventional wars. The doctrine, organizations, equipment and training of the U.S. military confirm this observation. The armed forces fought the global war on terrorism for the first five years with a counterinsurgency doctrine last revised in the Reagan administration. Despite engaging in numerous stability operations throughout the 1990s, the armed forces did little to bolster their capabilities for civic reconstruction and security force development. Procurement priorities during the 1990s followed the Cold War model, with significant funding devoted to new fighter aircraft and artillery systems. The most commonly used tactical scenarios in both schools and training centers replicated high-intensity interstate conflict. At the dawn of the 21st century, the U.S. is fighting brutal, adaptive insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, while our armed forces have spent the preceding decade having done little to prepare for such conflicts.

Having spent a decade preparing to fight the wrong war, America’s generals then miscalculated both the means and ways necessary to succeed in Iraq. The most fundamental military miscalculation in Iraq has been the failure to commit sufficient forces to provide security to Iraq’s population. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) estimated in its 1998 war plan that 380,000 troops would be necessary for an invasion of Iraq. Using operations in Bosnia and Kosovo as a model for predicting troop requirements, one Army study estimated a need for 470,000 troops. Alone among America’s generals, Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki publicly stated that “several hundred thousand soldiers” would be necessary to stabilize post-Saddam Iraq. Prior to the war, President Bush promised to give field commanders everything necessary for victory. Privately, many senior general officers both active and retired expressed serious misgivings about the insufficiency of forces for Iraq. These leaders would later express their concerns in tell-all books such as “Fiasco” and “Cobra II.” However, when the U.S. went to war in Iraq with less than half the strength required to win, these leaders did not make their objections public.

Given the lack of troop strength, not even the most brilliant general could have devised the ways necessary to stabilize post-Saddam Iraq. However, inept planning for postwar Iraq took the crisis caused by a lack of troops and quickly transformed it into a debacle. In 1997, the U.S. Central Command exercise “Desert Crossing” demonstrated that many postwar stabilization tasks would fall to the military. The other branches of the U.S. government lacked sufficient capability to do such work on the scale required in Iraq. Despite these results, CENTCOM accepted the assumption that the State Department would administer postwar Iraq. The military never explained to the president the magnitude of the challenges inherent in stabilizing postwar Iraq.

After failing to visualize the conditions of combat in Iraq, America’s generals failed to adapt to the demands of counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency theory prescribes providing continuous security to the population. However, for most of the war American forces in Iraq have been concentrated on large forward-operating bases, isolated from the Iraqi people and focused on capturing or killing insurgents. Counterinsurgency theory requires strengthening the capability of host-nation institutions to provide security and other essential services to the population. America’s generals treated efforts to create transition teams to develop local security forces and provincial reconstruction teams to improve essential services as afterthoughts, never providing the quantity or quality of personnel necessary for success.

After going into Iraq with too few troops and no coherent plan for postwar stabilization, America’s general officer corps did not accurately portray the intensity of the insurgency to the American public. The Iraq Study Group concluded that “there is significant underreporting of the violence in Iraq.” The ISG noted that “on one day in July 2006 there were 93 attacks or significant acts of violence reported. Yet a careful review of the reports for that single day brought to light 1,100 acts of violence. Good policy is difficult to make when information is systematically collected in a way that minimizes its discrepancy with policy goals.” Population security is the most important measure of effectiveness in counterinsurgency. For more than three years, America’s generals continued to insist that the U.S. was making progress in Iraq. However, for Iraqi civilians, each year from 2003 onward was more deadly than the one preceding it. For reasons that are not yet clear, America’s general officer corps underestimated the strength of the enemy, overestimated the capabilities of Iraq’s government and security forces and failed to provide Congress with an accurate assessment of security conditions in Iraq. Moreover, America’s generals have not explained clearly the larger strategic risks of committing so large a portion of the nation’s deployable land power to a single theater of operations.

The intellectual and moral failures common to America’s general officer corps in Vietnam and Iraq constitute a crisis in American generalship. Any explanation that fixes culpability on individuals is insufficient. No one leader, civilian or military, caused failure in Vietnam or Iraq. Different military and civilian leaders in the two conflicts produced similar results. In both conflicts, the general officer corps designed to advise policymakers, prepare forces and conduct operations failed to perform its intended functions. To understand how the U.S. could face defeat at the hands of a weaker insurgent enemy for the second time in a generation, we must look at the structural influences that produce our general officer corps.

The Generals We Need

The most insightful examination of failed generalship comes from J.F.C. Fuller’s “Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure.” Fuller was a British major general who saw action in the first attempts at armored warfare in World War I. He found three common characteristics in great generals — courage, creative intelligence and physical fitness.

The need for intelligent, creative and courageous general officers is self-evident. An understanding of the larger aspects of war is essential to great generalship. However, a survey of Army three- and four-star generals shows that only 25% hold advanced degrees from civilian institutions in the social sciences or humanities. Counterinsurgency theory holds that proficiency in foreign languages is essential to success, yet only one in four of the Army’s senior generals speaks another language. While the physical courage of America’s generals is not in doubt, there is less certainty regarding their moral courage. In almost surreal language, professional military men blame their recent lack of candor on the intimidating management style of their civilian masters. Now that the public is immediately concerned with the crisis in Iraq, some of our generals are finding their voices. They may have waited too long.

Neither the executive branch nor the services themselves are likely to remedy the shortcomings in America’s general officer corps. Indeed, the tendency of the executive branch to seek out mild-mannered team players to serve as senior generals is part of the problem. The services themselves are equally to blame. The system that produces our generals does little to reward creativity and moral courage. Officers rise to flag rank by following remarkably similar career patterns. Senior generals, both active and retired, are the most important figures in determining an officer’s potential for flag rank. The views of subordinates and peers play no role in an officer’s advancement; to move up he must only please his superiors. In a system in which senior officers select for promotion those like themselves, there are powerful incentives for conformity. It is unreasonable to expect that an officer who spends 25 years conforming to institutional expectations will emerge as an innovator in his late forties.

If America desires creative intelligence and moral courage in its general officer corps, it must create a system that rewards these qualities. Congress can create such incentives by exercising its proper oversight function in three areas. First, Congress must change the system for selecting general officers. Second, oversight committees must apply increased scrutiny over generating the necessary means and pursuing appropriate ways for applying America’s military power. Third, the Senate must hold accountable through its confirmation powers those officers who fail to achieve the aims of policy at an acceptable cost in blood and treasure.

To improve the creative intelligence of our generals, Congress must change the officer promotion system in ways that reward adaptation and intellectual achievement. Congress should require the armed services to implement 360-degree evaluations for field-grade and flag officers. Junior officers and non-commissioned officers are often the first to adapt because they bear the brunt of failed tactics most directly. They are also less wed to organizational norms and less influenced by organizational taboos. Junior leaders have valuable insights regarding the effectiveness of their leaders, but the current promotion system excludes these judgments. Incorporating subordinate and peer reviews into promotion decisions for senior leaders would produce officers more willing to adapt to changing circumstances, and less likely to conform to outmoded practices.

Congress should also modify the officer promotion system in ways that reward intellectual achievement. The Senate should examine the education and professional writing of nominees for three- and four-star billets as part of the confirmation process. The Senate would never confirm to the Supreme Court a nominee who had neither been to law school nor written legal opinions. However, it routinely confirms four-star generals who possess neither graduate education in the social sciences or humanities nor the capability to speak a foreign language. Senior general officers must have a vision of what future conflicts will look like and what capabilities the U.S. requires to prevail in those conflicts. They must possess the capability to understand and interact with foreign cultures. A solid record of intellectual achievement and fluency in foreign languages are effective indicators of an officer’s potential for senior leadership.

To reward moral courage in our general officers, Congress must ask hard questions about the means and ways for war as part of its oversight responsibility. Some of the answers will be shocking, which is perhaps why Congress has not asked and the generals have not told. Congress must ask for a candid assessment of the money and manpower required over the next generation to prevail in the Long War. The money required to prevail may place fiscal constraints on popular domestic priorities. The quantity and quality of manpower required may call into question the viability of the all-volunteer military. Congress must re-examine the allocation of existing resources, and demand that procurement priorities reflect the most likely threats we will face. Congress must be equally rigorous in ensuring that the ways of war contribute to conflict termination consistent with the aims of national policy. If our operations produce more enemies than they defeat, no amount of force is sufficient to prevail. Current oversight efforts have proved inadequate, allowing the executive branch, the services and lobbyists to present information that is sometimes incomplete, inaccurate or self-serving. Exercising adequate oversight will require members of Congress to develop the expertise necessary to ask the right questions and display the courage to follow the truth wherever it leads them.

Finally, Congress must enhance accountability by exercising its little-used authority to confirm the retired rank of general officers. By law, Congress must confirm an officer who retires at three- or four-star rank. In the past this requirement has been pro forma in all but a few cases. A general who presides over a massive human rights scandal or a substantial deterioration in security ought to be retired at a lower rank than one who serves with distinction. A general who fails to provide Congress with an accurate and candid assessment of strategic probabilities ought to suffer the same penalty. As matters stand now, a private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war. By exercising its powers to confirm the retired ranks of general officers, Congress can restore accountability among senior military leaders.

Mortal Danger

This article began with Frederick the Great’s admonition to his officers to focus their energies on the larger aspects of war. The Prussian monarch’s innovations had made his army the terror of Europe, but he knew that his adversaries were learning and adapting. Frederick feared that his generals would master his system of war without thinking deeply about the ever-changing nature of war, and in doing so would place Prussia’s security at risk. These fears would prove prophetic. At the Battle of Valmy in 1792, Frederick’s successors were checked by France’s ragtag citizen army. In the fourteen years that followed, Prussia’s generals assumed without much reflection that the wars of the future would look much like those of the past. In 1806, the Prussian Army marched lockstep into defeat and disaster at the hands of Napoleon at Jena. Frederick’s prophecy had come to pass; Prussia became a French vassal.

Iraq is America’s Valmy. America’s generals have been checked by a form of war that they did not prepare for and do not understand. They spent the years following the 1991 Gulf War mastering a system of war without thinking deeply about the ever changing nature of war. They marched into Iraq having assumed without much reflection that the wars of the future would look much like the wars of the past. Those few who saw clearly our vulnerability to insurgent tactics said and did little to prepare for these dangers. As at Valmy, this one debacle, however humiliating, will not in itself signal national disaster. The hour is late, but not too late to prepare for the challenges of the Long War. We still have time to select as our generals those who possess the intelligence to visualize future conflicts and the moral courage to advise civilian policymakers on the preparations needed for our security. The power and the responsibility to identify such generals lie with the U.S. Congress. If Congress does not act, our Jena awaits us.

Army Lt. Col. Paul Yingling is deputy commander, 3rd Armored Calvary Regiment. He has served two tours in Iraq, another in Bosnia and a fourth in Operation Desert Storm. He holds a master’s degree in political science from the University of Chicago. The views expressed here are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of the Army or the Defense Department.
© Copyright 2007 USA TODAY, a division of Gannett Co. Inc.

Find this article at:
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2007-04-28-failure-generalship_N.htm

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Ex-Marine Update: Interview Of Greg Floyd Sr. Details Franconia Shootings

June 29, 2007 2 comments

Interview Of Greg Floyd Sr. Details Franconia Shootings

BY AMY ASH NIXON Staff Writer

http://tinyurl.com/yuqc4y

- EDITOR’S NOTE: The following details the police interview of Gregory Floyd Sr., the man who shot Liko Kenney, Cpl. Bruce McKay’s killer. Yesterday’s paper featured police interviews with the two witnesses to the shootings, Gregory Floyd Jr. and Caleb Macaulay.

In an interview with Sgt. Charles West of the New Hampshire State Police on the night of the shootings, Gregory Floyd Sr., 49, who was the passer-by who came upon the scene, took Cpl. Bruce McKay’s gun and shot and killed Liko Kenney, Floyd shares his version of the accounts of that night.

The interview begins with the trooper informing Floyd, who is an ex-Marine and a convicted felon, that he is not under arrest and that he is free to leave at any point he chooses. He signs a Miranda form and is told that his son, who witnessed the shooting of Kenney by his father, is also at the state police barracks.

“I just don’t want him to get too upset,” Floyd said of his son, “because you know, he’s never saw no violence or nothing.”

Floyd is advised of his rights and as West reads him his rights, he says, “Yah, can we just cut, cut to the chase, and I’ll just initial em all because I know what they all mean.”

He says he does not want a lawyer. “I don’t think I’ve done anything wrong.”

West says, “I don’t want to rush through this, you understand what’s going on here?”

“Yah, yah, I understand,” Floyd says.

A few minutes into the interview – which is 80 pages in length – Floyd says to West, “I don’t think you guys are gonna charge me with, with murder or, or anything like that, because bas-, basically, uh, I was defending someone that was helpless.”

“OK, well let me start from this point here,” West says to him. “I, I have a general idea of what happened. Why don’t you in your own words um start, tell me the story what, what had happened?”

Floyd says he and his son, who is 18, had headed from their home on Hummingbird Lane in Easton to Mac’s that Friday evening to buy some groceries.

West asks Floyd if it was still light out, and he responds, “It was pretty light until there was 150 troopers there.”

Floyd says his son and he bought their groceries at Macs and were headed home, with his son driving, when they saw a police car and another vehicle, “bumper to ass, guess would be the best way to put it.”

The pair spotted the two cars on Route 116. “It’s not like a normal stop, where you see a car pulled over and a cruiser behind it kicked off a little,” Floyd says. He says McKay’s police SUV was “pushing the guy up against the bulldozer, uh you know, with his car.”

Floyd is asked to draw a map of what he saw. He said he was curious about the position of the cars, and how the police cruiser had Kenney’s car pushed up against a bulldozer so it couldn’t move. He said he was looking at the scene when he heard a gunshot.

“I knew that it had come from over, you know by the police and all because he came running by, holding his side like this and blood was uh, you know, coming out in spasms.

“There were two guys talking there and they said he’s a local policeman and him and this guy have some kind of grievance or …” Floyd says. “Something’s going on.”

Floyd continues, “I was sitting right, right there the whole time because they were in the middle of the road, not on either side like I told you, they were in the middle …”

“So (McKay) runs across the road, the oh, the policeman does,” Floyd says. “And they come behind him in a car and run him over, OK, and they back up and you know hit him again and the gun comes flying out the window, now I believe that that gun was still the perpetrator’s, I’m not positive.”

Floyd goes on, “I picked it up and I leaned, leaned in to see what this guy was doing and you know, pressed my elbow into the passenger’s throat to hold him in place and the other guy was trying to jack around then you know into the tenth millimeter …”

He said he had seen the gun he picked up in Kenney’s hand. Floyd said before he approached the car, the Kenney car had run McKay over a second time. “I said uh-huh, there’s a chance to, to save somebody.”

Floyd said he got out of his car and told his son to run to McKay’s cruiser and say “dispatch” and tell them that the officer needed help, and the location.

Floyd said he checked to make sure the gun he found was loaded and ready to shoot and said he saw Kenney “trying with both hands to unjam his gun, uh, be- because, um, for some reason, uh, he’d get one bullet in the chamber but the second bullet behind it wouldn’t let the slide shut but anyway while he was doing that, I just, I just shot him because ….”

Trooper West presses Floyd to determine if Floyd believed Kenney was attempting to reload to shoot him, and he said he did. “I wasn’t gonna let him get, get that gun loaded, either,” he says. He said he had pointed the gun at Caleb Macaulay’s face to warn him not to mess with him during the scuffle. “I point the gun at his face and tell him to get out of the car and get on his knees and if he moves I’m gonna blow his, blow his face off.”

Floyd said he then made sure he was in possession of both guns. He said he wasn’t sure if he had shot Kenney once or twice, but said he could have put two bullets in Kenney’s heart. “But I mean I, I wasn’t thinking of killing nobody but, uh, I’m not going to sit there and watch an innocent man being run over time and again, time and again …. In my mind (Kenney) was trying to kill him,” he said of what he witnessed happening to McKay.

As West continues to obtain information about Floyd’s eyewitness account, he asks him if he heard either Kenney or Macaulay say anything. “I heard the passenger say, ÔI can’t believe this, I can’t believe this,’ and you know, at at that point, you know, I’m ordering him out, it’s just too many damned guns around.”

The officer asks Floyd if he knew either the police officer or the two young men in the car, and he says he did not know any of them. Floyd is asked about a comment he had made earlier about having witnessed shootings before. He said he was in the Marine Corps during Vietnam.

“I worked for the government in places and things you can’t talk about,” he says.

He is asked if he has a criminal record and says he does – for marijuana charges in Georgia that led to a felony conviction. “I made a mistake, plain and simple,” he tells the officer.

At this point, West points out to Floyd that he has blood on his arm and asks him how it got there. “I took my shirt off and tried to uh make a tourniquet for the officer when he was trapped under the vehicle,” he says. The interview was being taped the same night as the shootings, May 11.

(Story continues below advertisement)

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There was one discrepancy in the way Floyd described one of the vehicles, and he points out that that could have occurred when about a half-dozen men moved the car “off the policeman” to try and save him.

Floyd expresses some concern about having shared his story at this point. “I’m worried because you know I know I’m a felon and I’ve taken a risk but I’m not gonna allow a man to be killed by being you know run over four or five times, I just, I’m just not made that way.”

He is asked about the medications he takes and if he consumed any alcohol that day, to which he responds, “No, I don’t drink.”

As trooper West continues to question Floyd, he asks him how Kenney knew he was there. Floyd responds, “I was telling the driver to stop and he looked up once …. You know and I’m screaming either put it down or, or you’re gonna die … I’m saying put it down, leave it alone, you know you want to live, whatever, whatever come into my mind that I thought he might let it go … and I wouldn’t have to shoot him but ….”

“Now did he respond at all?” West asks.

“No he looked up at me one time but he kept jacking you know and … as far as I, I’m concerned he was clearly a threat and had no remorse about running that police officer over with his car and you know trying to do it again, you know so why should I give him a chance, if he might shoot me, you know and I …”

“Did you, did you feel threatened by him?” West asks Floyd.

“Oh yah, till I got that gun away,” Floyd responds.

West then references an incident at Floyd’s home in 1997, when a scuffle with a meter reader led to state police coming to Floyd’s home, where he threatened three state police and was arrested for being a felon in possession of firearms. The case ended up being dismissed in court later, court records show.

West was one of the three state troopers who Floyd had threatened to give a third eye. West asks Floyd in the interview the night of the Kenney and McKay shootings about his use of firearms since that arrest, and he said he did some shooting on Prince Edward Island within the past year, and his wife owns a gun, but he does not.

Floyd, in the interview, refers to Macaulay and Kenney as “the bad guys,” and “the bandits,” several times.

A number of other witnesses’ testimony and officer testimony also is part of the reports released this week.

According to the state Chief’s Medical Examiner’s Office, McKay died from five gunshot wounds. He also had numerous other injuries from being run over, including lacerations, broken bones, a fractured skull and more. His cause of death was ruled a homicide.

Kenney, the Chief Medical Examiner’s Office ruled, died of two gunshot wounds, the manner of his death was also homicide. Toxicology results for Kenney revealed marijuana consumption, the autopsy showed.

The Caledonian-Record is a daily newspaper serving Northern Vermont and Northern New Hampshire. Visit our website updated daily at http://www.caledonianrecord.com

Note from the WebMaster: We request that you maintain proper credit to the Caledonian-Record Online News and to the author of the article. If you post this news article on your website we also request that you include a link to our website, which can be accomplished by using the following code:

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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

BTW…

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Response: Dick Gaines/aka: GyG
~~~~~

Who sez there are NO EX-MARINES!
THE HELL THERE AIN’T NO EX-MARINES! I SERVED W/MANY PRE-WWII, WWII, KOREAN WAR, ETC. MARINES WHO PROUDLY REFER TO THEMSELVES AND OTHERS AS “EX-MARINES”!!!!!

BIGMOUTH BOOT JARHEADS CLAIMING OTHERWISE DON’T MEAN ****!

Semper Fidelis
GyG


************************************
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R.W. “Dick” Gaines
GnySgt USMC (Ret.)
1952–(Plt #437, PISC)–’72
“The Original Gunny G!”
***************************
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Eye-Opening and Thought-Provoking Articles, etc.
**********
RESTORE THE REPUBLIC/
Take America Back!
Semper Fidelis
Dick Gaines
~~~~~~~~~~
*************************

Gunny G: The Wall…

June 29, 2007 Leave a comment


MENDING WALL

Robert Frost


Something there is that doesn’t love a wall,
That sends the frozen-ground-swell under it,
And spills the upper boulders in the sun,
And makes gaps even two can pass abreast.
The work of hunters is another thing:
I have come after them and made repair
Where they have left not one stone on a stone,
But they would have the rabbit out of hiding,
To please the yelping dogs. The gaps I mean,
No one has seen them made or heard them made,
But at spring mending-time we find them there.
I let my neighbor know beyond the hill;
And on a day we meet to walk the line
And set the wall between us once again.
We keep the wall between us as we go.
To each the boulders that have fallen to each.
And some are loaves and some so nearly balls
We have to use a spell to make them balance:
‘Stay where you are until our backs are turned!’
We wear our fingers rough with handling them.
Oh, just another kind of out-door game,
One on a side. It comes to little more:
There where it is we do not need the wall:
He is all pine and I am apple orchard.
My apple trees will never get across
And eat the cones under his pines, I tell him.
He only says,
‘Good fences make good neighbors’.

Spring is the mischief in me, and I wonder
If I could put a notion in his head:
‘Why do they make good neighbors? Isn’t it
Where there are cows?
But here there are no cows.
Before I built a wall I’d ask to know
What I was walling in or walling out,
And to whom I was like to give offence.
Something there is that doesn’t love a wall,
That wants it down.’ I could say ‘Elves’ to him,
But it’s not elves exactly, and I’d rather
He said it for himself. I see him there
Bringing a stone grasped firmly by the top
In each hand, like an old-stone savage armed.
He moves in darkness as it seems to me~
Not of woods only and the shade of trees.
He will not go behind his father’s saying,
And he likes having thought of it so well
He says again, “
Good fences make good neighbors.”

~~~~~

Dick Gaines

~~~~~

**************************************

************************************
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~Sites*Forums*Blogs~
R.W. “Dick” Gaines
GnySgt USMC (Ret.)
1952–(Plt #437, PISC)–’72
“The Original Gunny G!”
***************************
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**********
RESTORE THE REPUBLIC/
Take America Back!
Semper Fidelis
Dick Gaines
~~~~~~~~~~

Yet Another “Ex-Marine” Pops Punks

June 28, 2007 Leave a comment

Yet another “Ex-Marine” Pops Punks….

Please click-on link below, and also see responses on the next webpage…

http://tinyurl.com/3ahy47

The following is my own response to this article and the usual uproar by boot Marines over the use of the term “Ex-Marine”…

Who sez there are NO EX-MARINES!
THE HELL THERE AIN’T NO EX-MARINES! I SERVED W/MANY PRE-WWII, WWII, KOREAN WAR, ETC. MARINES WHO PROUDLY REFER TO THEMSELVES AND OTHERS AS “EX-MARINES”!!!!!

BIGMOUTH BOOT JARHEADS CLAIMING OTHERWISE DON’T MEAN ****!

Semper Fidelis
GyG

Challenging The Gatekeepers

June 28, 2007 Leave a comment

http://tinyurl.com/29k6pc

************************************
Gunny G’s GLOBE and ANCHOR
~Sites*Forums*Blogs~
R.W. “Dick” Gaines
GnySgt USMC (Ret.)
1952–(Plt #437, PISC)–’72
“The Original Gunny G!”
***************************
Sites…

http://www.angelfire.com/ca4/gunnyg/sites3.html

Forums…

http://www.network54.com/Forum/135069

Blogs…

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The GyG Weblog @N54.com

http://www.network54.com/Forum/247172/

GyG’s History/Traditions, etc.

http://www.network54.com/Forum/220604/

The GyG Mailbag* Archive*Bookmarks @FURL

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Want On GyG’s E-Mail List?
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ADD In Subject Line…
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USMC, History, Unusual/Controversial, Politically Incorrect, News-n-Views,
Eye-Opening and Thought-Provoking Articles, etc.
**********
RESTORE THE REPUBLIC/
Take America Back!
Semper Fidelis
Dick Gaines
~~~~~~~~~~

The Tao of Ron Paul

June 27, 2007 Leave a comment

The Tao of Ron Paul
by Jeffrey L. Bryan

DIGG THIS

Long before Mises and Rothbard, Lao-Tzu introduced libertarian ideas to China with the Tao Te Ching. Selections from that ancient book of philosophy illustrate the wisdom that would shape American policy under the administration of President Ron Paul.

From Chapter 17 of the Tao Te Ching: “In the highest antiquity, the people did not know that there were rulers. In the next age they loved them and praised them. In the next they feared them; in the next they despised them.”

Since 9/11, George W. Bush has run the gamut. Just after 9/11, he was loved and praised (by a country desperate for leadership); later he was feared (by Americans concerned about tyranny, not to mention the people of Iraq); and today he is despised by most of the world and the majority of his country. Lao-Tzu describes this process of degeneration over vast ages of history – for Dubya, it took about three or four years.

Chapter 17 continues: “How irresolute did those (earliest rulers) appear, showing (by their reticence) the importance which they set upon their words! Their work was done and their undertakings were successful, while the people all said, ‘We are as we are, of ourselves!'”

Ron Paul believes in liberty, letting people be as they are. One consequence of liberty is the free market, in which every individual is permitted to make his or her own choices. Free people will find better solutions than even a “beloved” ruler can impose, and Congressman Paul knows it. Every vote he casts in Congress proves the depth of his belief in this principle.

Chapter 30: “He who would assist a lord of men in harmony with the Tao will not assert his mastery in the kingdom by force of arms. Such a course is sure to meet with its proper return.”

This immediately evokes the famous Ron Paul–Rudy Giuliani confrontation over the motives for the 9/11 attack. If Giuliani has no time (or stomach) to read Blowback, or the 9/11 Commission Report, perhaps he could at least be persuaded to look over these short verses. America’s decades of attempting to “assert its mastery” over the Middle East “by force of arms,” at least as far back as 1953, brought the inevitable “return” on 9/11.

Or, to put it in Sir Isaac Newton’s terms, every action has an equal and opposite reaction. This is as true in politics as in physics.

Chapter 30 continues: “Wherever a host is stationed, briars and thorns spring up. In the sequence of great armies there are sure to be bad years.” Congressman Paul wants to see an end to the policy of maintaining bases in more than a hundred countries around the world, which has yielded “briars and thorns” in the form of resentment and hostility against America. Ironically, a remarkable number of American citizens seem unaware that their own country possesses this empire of foreign bases, which sometimes prop up oppressive local regimes.

However, if we were attacked by a foreign nation or entity during a President Paul administration, what might the consequences be? Verse 30 continues: “A skilful commander strikes a decisive blow, and stops. He does not dare (by continuing his operations) to assert and complete his mastery. He will strike the blow, but will be on his guard against being vain or boastful or arrogant in consequence of it. He strikes it as a matter of necessity; he strikes it, but not from a wish for mastery.”

This reflects the military policy of a Paul administration: Use all force necessary to protect the country, but not more. Do not attempt to intimidate or dominate the world. Congressman Paul takes the value of human life, and therefore the wastefulness of war, very seriously. Besides, haven’t we suffered enough vanity, boastfulness and arrogance from the White House in recent years?

Chapter 57: “A state may be ruled by (measures of) correction; weapons of war may be used with crafty dexterity; (but) the kingdom is made one’s own (only) by freedom from action and purpose.

How do I know that it is so? By these facts: In the kingdom the multiplication of prohibitive enactments increases the poverty of the people; the more implements to add to their profit that the people have, the greater disorder is there in the state and clan; the more acts of crafty dexterity that men possess, the more do strange contrivances appear; the more display there is of legislation, the more thieves and robbers there are.”

Probably unique among American politicians, “Dr. No” has a long history of resisting the temptation to intervene and regulate. Students of Austrian economics already well understand that government intervention rarely achieves its ostensible ends, while inflicting a host of damaging side effects and unintended consequences. Government schools are consciously designed to suppress learning and thinking ability. FEMA not only didn’t help Katrina survivors, it worked hard to prohibit local workers and private charity from mounting an effective relief effort. Drug prohibition increases violent crime (without reducing drug use) and enriches criminals. And so on, and on, and on.

This is further addressed in Chapter 58: “The government that seems the most unwise, Oft goodness to the people best supplies; That which is meddling, touching everything, Will work but ill, and disappointment bring.” (I am personally annoyed at this translator’s occasional attempts at rhyme). It continues: “The (method of) correction shall by a turn become distortion, and the good in it shall by a turn become evil. The delusion of the people (on this point) has indeed subsisted for a long time.”

Congressman Paul, a scholar in the area of economics, understands that attempts at public good rapidly become public evil. It is simply impossible for a president or a legislature to decide what is best for every single member of the population – far better to let individuals decide for themselves. Even if successful centralized decisions were possible, how many politicians would actually choose public interest over lobbyist money? I can name one.

However, many people continue to call for state regulation as the first and only method to address any problem that arises. The “delusion” that the government is here to help “has indeed subsisted for a long time” – and continues to subsist millennia after those words were written.

Then there is the famous Chapter 60: “Governing a great state is like cooking a small fish.” One must take care with a small fish; a little too much heat will burn it, a little too much poking will destroy it. Again, Lao-Tzu and Congressman Paul agree on matters of government policy (although I’m not sure how Dr. Paul cooks his fish).

Chapter 61: “What makes a great state is its being (like) a low-lying, down-flowing (stream); it becomes the centre to which tend (all the small states) under heaven.”

(Apparently I’m using a British translation.)

Dr. Paul prescribes a humble foreign policy, in which we do not attempt to coerce other nations to obey our will. He endorses the approach of Thomas Jefferson: “Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none.” This policy would both increase America’s number of friends and enhance its standing in the world, while removing the motives for anti-American hostility. Furthermore, a noninterventionist foreign policy would save taxpayers many trillions of dollars, money that is sorely needed here at home.

Finally, Chapter 75: “The people suffer from famine because of the multitude of taxes consumed by their superiors. It is through this that they suffer famine.”

Ron Paul is the only candidate who consistently points out that Americans suffer not only direct taxation, but indirect taxation through debt and inflation. As a longtime public opponent of the Federal Reserve, he stands for sound monetary and fiscal policy.

And that’s the Tao of Ron Paul. For those who doubt a principled man who tells the truth can reach the White House, just remember Chapter 78: “There is nothing in the world more soft and weak than water, and yet for attacking things that are firm and strong, there is nothing that can take precedence of it.”

June 27, 2007

Jeffrey L. Bryan [send him mail] is a free-lance writer.

Copyright © 2007 LewRockwell.com

Find this article at:
http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig8/bryan1.html
********************************************

************************************
Gunny G’s GLOBE and ANCHOR
~Sites*Forums*Blogs~
R.W. “Dick” Gaines
GnySgt USMC (Ret.)
1952–(Plt #437, PISC)–’72
“The Original Gunny G!”
***************************
Sites…
http://www.angelfire.com/ca4/gunnyg/sites3.html
Forums…
http://www.network54.com/Forum/135069
Blogs…
http://gunnyg.blogspot.com/
The GyG Weblog @N54.com
http://www.network54.com/Forum/247172/
GyG’s History/Traditions, etc.
http://www.network54.com/Forum/220604/
The GyG Mailbag* Archive*Bookmarks @FURL
http://www.furl.net/members/gunnyg
Want On GyG’s E-Mail List?
Send/Reply: GunnyG*At*GMail.com
ADD In Subject Line…
*************************************
NOTE:
Latest Posts-/Archive GyG @ FURL…
http://www.furl.net/members/gunnyg
USMC, History, Unusual/Controversial, Politically Incorrect, News-n-Views,

Eye-Opening and Thought-Provoking Articles, etc.
**********
RESTORE THE REPUBLIC
Semper Fidelis
Dick Gaines
~~~~~~~~~~

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