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How Libertarians Ought To Think About The U.S. Civil War
Reason Papers ^ | Spring 2006 | TIMOTHY SANDEFUR
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Posted on 09/17/2007 5:35:27 PM EDT by Delacon
How Libertarians Ought To Think About The U.S. Civil War
By Timothy Sandefur
[Reason Papers vol. 28, pp. 61-83, Spring 2006]
I. Introduction
For decades, outspoken libertarians have seen the Civil War not only as a
historical calamity, but as a political calamity as well. According to many libertarians,
the Union victory in the Civil War, and the presidency of Abraham Lincoln in general,
represented a betrayal of American Constitution and of the fundamental principles of
American political philosophy.
This interpretation rests on two major arguments as well as a variety of more
minor concerns. The more minor concerns include specific critiques of the policies of the
Lincoln Administration, or of the conduct of the War by Union forces. For example,
many libertarians condemn the Union for instituting a military draft, or for suspending
the writ of habeas corpus. There are many of these specific criticisms, which deserve
detailed discussion which cannot be provided here.1 Suffice to say that some of these
criticisms are well-founded; indeed, libertarians deplore war precisely because it tends to
give rise to such evils.
Understanding the Civil War as a matter of political philosophy, however,
requires a systematic, two-step analysis: first, does a state have the legal authority under
the United States Constitution, to secede unilaterally? If the answer to this question is
yes, then the analysis is at an end: if states have the right to secede, the Union was in the
wrong to put down the Confederacy. If, however, the answer is no, then we must proceed
to a second step: even illegal acts, like the American Revolution, are justified by the right
1 For example, it ought to be noted that the Confederacy instituted a military draft as well, and did so before
the Union did. J. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom (New York: Ballantine, 1988) p. 427.
of revolution, so even if the Constitution does prohibit secession, the people of the
southern states had the right to rebel against the Union, if their act was a legitimate act of
revolution. It is essential to keep in mind the distinction between secession and
revolution. As Lincoln wrote, “It might seem, at first thought, to be of little difference
whether the present movement at the South be called ’secession’ or ‘rebellion.’ The
movers, however, well understand the [*62] difference.”2 Was, then, the Confederate
rebellion a legitimate act of revolution?
The prevailing libertarian answers to these questions are, first, that states have the
constitutional right to secede, and that Abraham Lincoln violated the Constitution by
leading the nation into war against the seceding states. This argument is based on the
“compact theory” of the Constitution. Second, the prevailing argument holds that the
rebellion represented a legitimate act of revolution. This argument is based on the
concept of “self-determination.”3 These premises, however, are invalid, as are the
prevailing libertarian conclusions. In fact, states have no constitutional authority to
secede from the union unilaterally; nor were southern states engaged in a legitimate act of
revolution, because they initiated force, rather than acting in defense of individual rights.
II. Do States Have The Legal Right to Secede?
A. Three Interpretations of Union
2 R. Basler, ed., Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 8 vols. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press,
1953) 4:432.
3 See, e.g., J. Livingston, “A Moral Accounting of The Union And The Confederacy.” Journal of
Libertarian Studies. 16:2 pp. 57-101 (2002).
There are at least three ways of looking at the nature of the federal union under
the Constitution. First, the “compact theory” of the Constitution holds that it is much like
a treaty between essentially independent states. This theory found its first major
expression in the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, drafted by Thomas Jefferson and
James Madison, respectively, as a protest to the Alien and Sedition laws in 1798.4 In the
1830s, South Carolina Senator John C. Calhoun based his theory of nullification on these
resolutions—despite Madison’s repudiation of nullification—and thereby laid the
intellectual foundation for secession thirty years later.5 According to the compact theory,
each state is a sovereign entity which is bound to the other states only by a compact
which it may break whenever the compact imposes unbearable burdens on the state—just
as a country may decide to break a treaty. Under the compact theory, the federal union
contains no inherent element of sovereignty—it is a league of sovereign states. In
Calhoun’s view, [*63] the Constitution “is the government of States united in a political
union, in contradistinction to a government of individuals socially united…the
government of a community of States, and not the government of a single State or
nation.”6
Opposed to the compact theory are two theories that we may call the “weak
union” and the “strong union” views. According to these views, the federal Constitution
is not a treaty, but a law, and the federal union contains at least some element of
4 D. Mayer, The Constitutional Thought of Thomas Jefferson . (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia,
1994) p. 201.
5 D. McCoy, The Last of The Fathers: James Madison And The Republican Legacy (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1989) pp. 132-62; L. Banning, The Sacred Fire of Liberty. (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1995) pp. 387-95.
6 C. Post, ed., A Disquisition on Government And Selections from The Discourses by John C. Calhoun.
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1953) p. 86.
sovereignty; the federal union is not seen as a league of sovereigns, but as the government
of a single State or nation.
The strong-union view, most famously espoused by Daniel Webster, and later
adopted by Abraham Lincoln, Charles Sumner, and even Lysander Spooner,7 the union of
states predates the Constitution itself: it was created by the Declaration of Independence,
and the sovereignty of the states was itself a consequence or product of national
sovereignty. This view has much to commend it; the Declaration of Independence, for
instance, was issued in the name of the “thirteen united States of America,” who, as “ one
people” were breaking their former political bonds, and declaring that “these united
colonies are free and independent states.” It then goes on to describe what “free and
independent states may of right do”—things like carrying on foreign policy—none of
which were actually done by the states. In fact, at the 1787 Philadelphia Convention,
Delegate Rufus King explained that
The states were not “sovereigns” in the sense contended for by some.
They did not possess the peculiar features of sovereignty,—they could not
make war, nor peace, nor alliances, nor treaties. Considering them as
political beings, they were dumb, for they could not speak to any foreign
sovereign whatever. They were deaf, for they could not hear any
propositions from such sovereign. They had not even the organs or
faculties of defence or offence, for they could not of themselves raise
troops, or equip vessels, for war…. If the states, therefore, retained some
portion of their sovereignty [after declaring independence], they had
certainly divested themselves of essential portions of it.8
7 L. Spooner, The Unconstitutionality of Slavery (Boston: Bela Marsh, 1860) pp. 56, 78-79.
8 J. Elliott, ed., Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution . 5
vols. (Washington: Elliott, 1836) 5:212-213. This argument formed a central point in Justice Sutherland’s
interpretation of federal foreign policy power in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp ., 299 U.S.
304 (1936). See J. Eastman and H. V. Jaffa, “Understanding Justice Sutherland As He Understood
Himself,” University of Chicago Law Review 63:1347. 1352 n. 17 (1996).
[*64] James Wilson (a signer of the Declaration) agreed, saying that he “could not
admit the doctrine that when the colonies became independent of Great Britain, they
became independent also of each other. He read the Declaration of Independence,
observing thereon, that the United Colonies were declared free and independent states,
and inferring, that they were independent, not individually, but unitedly, and that they
were confederated, as they were independent states.”9 Consequently, the Constitution of
1787 did not purport to create the union, only to make it “more perfect.” Jefferson and
Madison called the Declaration of Independence “the fundamental act of union of these
States,”10 and even at the South Carolina Ratification Convention, when one delegate
claimed that “[t]he [1783] treaty of peace expressly agreed to acknowledge us as free,
sovereign, and independent states…[b]ut this new Constitution at once swept those
privileges away, being sovereign over all,” Charles Cotesworth Pinckney answered that
“[t]he separate independence and individual sovereignty of the several states were never
thought of by the enlightened band of patriots who framed this Declaration; the several
states are not even mentioned by name in any part of it,—as if it was intended to impress
this maxim on America, that our freedom and independence arose from our union, and
that without it we could neither be free nor independent.”11
There are ambiguities, however, which undermine the strong union view. Section
two of the Articles of Confederation, for example, did acknowledge the separate
sovereignty of the American states: “Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and
independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this
Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.” This
9 Elliott (1836) 5:213.
10 M. Peterson, ed., Jefferson: Writings (New York: Library of America, 1984) p. 479.
11 Elliott (1836) 4:287, 301.
seems inconsistent with the view that the union was created by the Declaration.
And the fact that the Continental Congress carried out foreign policy only shows that the
federative power,12 which is only part of the national [*65] sovereignty, was vested in the
national government. The nature of federal sovereignty at the time of the American
founding was at least ambiguous13—surely one reason that the union needed to be made
more perfect eleven years later.
The “weak-union” view was most famously espoused by James Madison.
According to it, the Articles of Confederation did indeed acknowledge the separate
sovereignty of the American states—and that was exactly the problem. Alexander
Hamilton put it well in a sentence which is the theme of the entire Federalist: “The great
and radical vice in the construction of the existing Confederation is in the principle of
LEGISLATION for STATES or GOVERNMENTS, in their CORPORATE or
COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of
which they consist.”14 The new Constitution would solve this problem by creating a new
kind of government—one of “divided sovereignty,” partly national and partly federal, in
which all of the people of America would vest the national government with a part—
limited and enumerated—of their sovereignty. The national sovereignty would therefore
be totally separate from the sovereignty of the states. This is why Madison insisted that
the Constitution be ratified, not by state legislatures, but by special ratification
conventions: to make clear that the states were not parties to the Constitution—thus it
12 In his Second Treatise, Locke explains that the “federative power” is that part of the executive power
which deals with foreign relations. P. Laslett, ed., John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, rev ed. 1963) pp. 409-412.
13 Justice Chase pointed out some ambiguities in his opinion in Ware v. Hylton , 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 224-
225, 231-232 (1796).
14 C. Rossiter, ed., The Federalist (New York: Signet, 1961) p. 108; see also J. Rakove, ed., Madison:
Writings (New York: Library of America, 1999) p. 69.
would “be then a government established by the thirteen States of America, not through
the intervention of the Legislatures, but by the people at large…[a] distinction…[which] is
very material.”15 Thus, contrary to the strong-union view, the sovereignty of the states
did not depend on the creation of the federal authority; they were two wholly independent
systems, in which the federal power was supreme within its limited sphere—and
nonexistent outside of that sphere. One might analogize divided sovereignty to a
homeowner who receives separate bills from the electric company and the gas company.
An American citizen is separately a citizen of the state and of the federal union, and
neither of these types of citizenship is superior to or inferior to the other.
[*66] Under either the weak-union view or the strong-union view, states have no
unilateral power to secede. Thus, in addressing whether the Confederacy had the
constitutional authority to secede, it is unnecessary to resolve the question of whether the
union was created by the Declaration of Independence or not, because ratification
resolved the fundamental point: the federal union was an agreement between the people,
not the states. The Constitution’s fundamental premise of divided sovereignty—
respected by both the weak-union and strong-union views, means that the people of
America are bound together as one people for certain purposes—and therefore a state
may not unilaterally secede.
B. What Divided Sovereignty Means16
15 B. Bailyn, ed., Debate On The Constitution (New York: Library of America, 1993) 2:619.
16 Obviously, in the following, I refer only to the Constitution as it existed before the Fourteenth
Amendment, which changed the nature of state and federal sovereignty.
Because the sovereignty of a state is distinct from that of the union, a state can no
more absolve its people of their allegiance to the federal government than the gas
company can absolve a customer from paying her electric bill. The people, who adopted
the Constitution, may decide to allow the people of a state to leave the union—through
Congressional action (according to the weak-union view), or by adopting a Constitutional
Amendment (according to the strong-union view). But unilateral secession is
unconstitutional.
“In the compound republic of America,” said Madison, “the power surrendered by
the people is first divided between two distinct governments….”17 But “[t]he main
[fallacy] of nullification,” he later explained,
is the assumption that sovereignty is a unit, at once indivisible and
unalienable; that the states therefore individually retain it entire as they
originally held it, and, consequently, that no portion of it can belong to the
U.S…. [W]here does the sovereignty which makes such a Constitution
reside[?] It resides not in a single state but in the people of each of the
several states, uniting with those of the others in the express & solemn
compact which forms the Constitution. To the extent of that compact or
Constitution, therefore, the people of the several States must be a
sovereign as they are a united people…. That a sovereignty should have
even been denied to the States in their united character, may well excite
wonder, when it is recollected that the Constitution which now unites
them, was announced by the convention which formed it, as dividing
sovereignty between the Union & the States; that it was presented under
that view, by contemporary expositions recommending it to the ratifying
[*66] authorities; that it has proved to have been so understood by the
language which has been applied to it constantly….18
Divided sovereignty (also called “dual sovereignty”), was the principal innovation
of the Constitution. While the strong-union view saw ratification as simply an
overhauling of the union, to the weak-union view, ratification reformed the sovereignty
17 Rossiter (1961) p. 323.
18 M. Meyers, ed., The Mind of The Founder: Sources of the Political Thought of James Madison (Hanover:
University Press of New England, rev. ed. 1981) pp. 436-38.
of the states as well as of the federal government. But according to both views, federal
sovereignty is independent of the sovereignty of the states.
Even Anti-Federalists acknowledged that ratifying the Constitution meant
redefining American sovereignty. “Cincinnatus,” for instance, complained that “[s]uch is
the anxiety manifested by the framers of the proposed constitution, for the utter extinction
of the state sovereignties, that they were not content with taking from them every
attribute of sovereignty, but would not leave them even the name.—Therefore, in the very
commencement they prescribe this remarkable declaration—We the People of the United
States.”19 The “Federal Farmer” wrote that “when the people [of each state] shall adopt
the proposed…it will be adopted not by the people of New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
&c., but by the people of the United States….”20 Robert Yates opposed ratification of the
Constitution precisely on these grounds: he admitted that “if it is ratified, [it] will not be a
compact entered into by the States, in their corporate capacities, but an agreement of the
people of the United States as one great body politic…. It is to be observed, it is not a
union of states or bodies corporate; had this been the case the existence of the state
governments might have been secured. But it is a union of the people of the United
States considered as one body, who are to ratify this constitution, if it is adopted.”21
Indeed, at the Virginia Ratification Convention, Patrick Henry challenged James Madison
on this point: “Who authorized [the Constitutional Convention] to speak the language of
We the people, instead of We, the States? States are the characteristics, and the soul of a
confederation.”22 Madison replied that the authority of the Articles of [*67]
19 Bailyn (1993), 1:118-119.
20 Bailyn (1993) 1: 275
21 P. Kurland and R. Lerner, eds., The Founders’ Constitution (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund 1987) 4:237.
22 Bailyn (1993) 2:596-597.
Confederation had been “derived from the dependent derivative authority of the
legislatures of the states; whereas this [Constitution] is derived from the superior power
of the people.”23 The Constitution did not consolidate the states entirely, but “[s]hould all
the States adopt it, it will be then a government established by the thirteen States of
America, not through the intervention of the Legislatures, but by the people at large.”24
Opponents of the Constitution, therefore, were well aware that the Constitution
would create, not a league of essentially independent sovereignties, but a new nation,
retaining its own sovereignty for certain limited purposes. The Federalists explicitly
defended this fact: for most purposes, they explained, the people of the states would find
their state citizenship unchanged, but for a specified list of other purposes, the whole
people of America would now agree, as a single political unit, to invest the union with
sovereignty directly, not through any intermediary step of state authorities. The federal
and the state sovereignty travel, as it were, on parallel rails: state sovereignty connecting
the sovereignty of the people of a state to their state capitol; federal sovereignty joining
all the people through its national network, to arrive at Washington, D.C. James Wilson,
signer of both the Constitution and the Declaration, told the Pennsylvania Ratification
Convention that
the sovereignty resides in the people, they have not parted with it; they
have only dispensed such portions of power as were conceived necessary
for the public welfare…. In order to recognize this leading principle, the
proposed system sets out with a declaration, that its existence depends
upon the supreme authority of the people alone…. When the principle is
once settled, that the people are the source of authority, the consequence
23 Bailyn (1993) 2:619.
24 Id.
is, that they may take from the subordinate governments with which they
have hitherto trusted them, and place those powers in the general
government, if it is thought that they will be productive of more good…. I
have no idea, that a safe system of power, in the government, sufficient to
manage the general interest of the United States, could be drawn from any
other source, or rested in any other authority than that of the people at
large, and I consider this authority as the rock on which this structure will
stand.25
[*68] So while the states would, for the most part, retain their sovereignty,
ratification meant that the whole People of the United States would now agree to vest
their inchoate power to engage in, for example, foreign policy, exclusively in the federal
government, which would be supreme for the limited, enumerated purposes of the federal
union; otherwise, wrote Hamilton, the Constitution would “be a mere treaty, dependent
on the good faith of the parties, and not a government, which is only another word for
POLITICAL POWER AND SUPREMACY.”26 For Hamilton, the reason for a new
Constitution was precisely to end the notion that the union was a league of sovereigns:
one of the “infirmities” of the Articles of Confederation, he wrote, was
that it never had a ratification by the PEOPLE. Resting on no better
foundation than the consent of the several legislatures, it has been exposed
to frequent and intricate questions concerning the validity of its powers,
and has, in some instances, given birth to the enormous doctrine of a right
of legislative repeal. Owing its ratification to the law of a State, it has been
contended that the same authority might repeal the law by which it was
ratified. However gross a heresy it may be to maintain that a party to a
compact has a right to revoke that compact, the doctrine itself has had
respectable advocates. The possibility of a question of this nature proves
the necessity of laying the foundations of our national government deeper
than in the mere sanction of delegated authority. The fabric of American
empire ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF THE
PEOPLE. The streams of national power ought to flow immediately from
that pure, original fountain of all legitimate authority.27
25 Bailyn (1993) 1:820-21.
26 Rossiter (1961) 204.
27 Rossiter (1961) 152.
One argument against the principle of divided sovereignty is that the Constitution was
adopted by the members of distinct states, rather than by a national referendum. But
Chief Justice John Marshall (who had been a delegate to the Virginia Ratification
Convention) answered that in McColloch v. Maryland:
[The Constitution] was submitted to the people. They acted upon it in the
only manner in which they can act safely, effectively, and wisely, on such
a subject, by assembling in Convention. It is true, they assembled in their
several States—and where else should they have [*69] assembled? No
political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of breaking down the
lines which separate the States, and of compounding the American people
into one common mass. Of consequence, when they act, they act in their
States. But the measures they adopt do not, on that account, cease to be the
measures of the people themselves, or become the measures of the State
governments.28
This was not only the opinion of High Federalists like Marshall. As Madison explained
(long after his break with the Federalists), the Constitution was formed
by the people in each of the States, acting in their highest sovereign
capacity…. Being thus derived from the same source as the Constitutions
of the States, it…is as much a Constitution, in the strict sense of the term,
within its prescribed sphere, as the Constitutions of the States are within
their respective spheres; but with this obvious & essential difference, that
being a compact among the States in their highest sovereign capacity, and
constituting the people thereof one people for certain purposes, it cannot
be altered or annulled at the will of the States individually, as the
Constitution of a State may be at its individual will.29
28 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403 (1819). See also Chisolm v. Georgia , 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 435 (1793) (“The
powers of the general Government…do for the most part (if not wholly) affect individuals, and not States:
They require no aid from any State authority. This is the great leading distinction between the old articles
of confederation, and the present constitution”); id. at 470 (Jay, C.J.) (“the people, in their collective and
national capacity, established the present Constitution”); Respublica v. Corbbet , 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 467
(1798); Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 178 (1796) (per Paterson, J.,); id. at 181 (per Iredell,
J.); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 236 (1796) (per Chase, J.); Banks v. Greenleaf, 10 Va. 271, 277-
78 (1799) (“the general government derives its existence and power from the people, and not from the
states, yet each state government derives its powers from the people of that particular state. Their forms of
government are different, being derived from different sources; and their laws are different.”)
29 Rakove (1999), p. 843.
These sources reveal how well understood was the central fact that the Constitution was a
government of the whole people of the United States, not a league or treaty of states in
their corporate capacities, as the compact theory would have it. Contrary to Calhoun’s
later claim that “the States, when they formed and ratified the Constitution, were distinct,
independent, and [*70] sovereign communities,”30 the reality is that, in Marshall’s words,
federal sovereignty
proceeds directly from the people; is ‘ordained and established’ in the
name of the people…. It required not the affirmance, and could not be
negatived, by the State governments. The constitution, when thus adopted,
was of complete obligation, and bound the State sovereignties…. The
government of the Union, then…is, emphatically, and truly, a government
of the people. In form and in substance it emanates from them. Its powers
are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their
benefit…. [T]he government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is
supreme within its sphere of action.31
As Justice Anthony Kennedy recently put it, “The Framers split the atom of sovereignty.
It was the genius of their idea that our citizens would have two political capacities, one
state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other…with its own direct
relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people
who sustain it and are governed by it…. [T]he National Government, the mark of its
legitimacy, is that it owes its existence to the act of the whole people who created it.”32
The federal government is directly vested with sovereignty of the whole People of the
United States. Secession is not, therefore, like a person who chooses to cancel his
membership in a club—because the states are not in the “club” to begin with. Only “We
the People” are members of the federal club, and only the “people” which created it can
30 Post (1953) p. 91.
31 M’Colloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403-405 (1819).
32 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838-39 (1995).
change it, by altering the contours of that “people” through amendment, or a new
Constitutional Convention. So, while the whole people may allow a state out of the
union, or may even dissolve the Constitution entirely, a state cannot claim on its own the
authority to withdraw from the union. Lincoln put it with dry understatement when he
noted that advocates of secession were “not partial to that power which made the
Constitution, and speaks from the preamble, calling itself ‘We, the People.’”33
These sources reveal that in 1787, both the federalists and anti-federalists
recognized that the United States Constitution was just that—a constitution [*71] for a
nation, not a league of sovereign states. And, if these sources are not enough, as Akhil
Reed Amar points out, “no major proponent of the Constitution sought to win over states’
rightists by conceding that states could unilaterally nullify or secede in the event of
perceived national abuses. The Federalists’ silence is especially impressive because such
a concession might have dramatically improved the document’s ratification prospects in
several states.”34 “[I]f a more explicit guard against misconstruction was not provided,”
wrote Madison in 1831, “it is explained…by the entire absence of apprehension that it
could be necessary.”35
Some of those who defend the constitutionality of secession claim that it was
foreseen, and that several states ratified the constitution did so with explicit reservations
of the right to secede.36 This claim, however, is seriously exaggerated. The only state
which passed such a “reservation” while ratifying, and which later seceded, was Virginia.
That state’s “reservation” read: “The powers granted under the Constitution being
33 Basler (1953) 4:437.
34 A. Amar, “Of Sovereignty and Federalism,” Yale Law Journal 96:1425, 1462 n.162.
35 Rakove (1999) p. 853.
36 T. DiLorezno, The Real Lincoln : A New Look at Abraham Lincoln, His Agenda, and an Unnecessary
War (Roseville: Prima Publishing, 2002) p. 91.
derived from the People of the United States may be resumed by them whenever the same
shall be perverted to their injury or oppression.”37 These phrases nowhere mention any
right to unilateral secession, nor to any unconditional right to revolt for any reason the
state sees fit. Instead, the “reservation” is simply a restatement of the right to revolution,
which we will consider below. Moreover, it is made in the name, not of the people of
Virginia, but of “the People of the United States,” and it makes the unremarkable
assertion that they have the right to change their government.
It is also frequently argued that another set of Resolutions, the Virginia and
Kentucky Resolutions, reveal the true nature of the Constitution as a league of sovereign
states, and that Madison’s later repudiation of the compact theory was an instance of
intellectual dishonesty. The facts, as usual, are more complicated. Jefferson, whose
Kentucky Resolutions unequivocally endorsed the compact theory, sent a draft to
Madison for his review. Madison was somewhat startled by Jefferson’s argument, and he
replied, “Have you ever considered thoroughly the distinction between the power of the
State, & that of the Legislature, on questions relating to the federal pact[?] On the
supposition that the former is clearly the ultimate Judge of infractions, it does [*72] not
follow that the latter is the legitimate organ especially as a convention was the organ by
which the Compact was made.”38 Madison’s Virginia Resolutions were somewhat more
guarded, and, he insisted, never endorsed the compact theory of the Constitution.
Decades later, writing furiously to oppose Calhoun’s doctrine of nullification, Madison
explained, just as he had at the Philadelphia and Richmond conventions, that the
37 Emphasis added.
38 Rakove (1999) p. 392.
Constitution was binding on the people, not on the states, and the states had no right to
nullify the laws:
[T]he characteristic peculiarities of the Constitution are 1. The mode of its
formation, 2. The division of the supreme powers of Govt between the
States in their united capacity and the States in their individual capacities.
1. It was formed, not by the Governments of the component States, as the
Federal Govt. for which it was substituted [i.e., the Articles of
Confederation] was formed; nor was it formed by a majority of the people
of the U.S. as a single community in the manner of a consolidated
Government. It was formed by the States—that is by the people in each of
the States, acting in their highest sovereign capacity; and formed,
consequently, by the same authority which formed the State Constitutions.
Being thus derived from the same source as the Constitutions of the States,
it has within each State, the same authority as the Constitution of the State,
and is as much a Constitution, in the strict sense of the term, within its
prescribed sphere, as the Constitutions of the States are within their
respective spheres, but with this obvious & essential difference, that being
a compact among the States in their highest sovereign capacity, and
constituting the people thereof one people for certain purposes, it cannot
be altered or annulled at the will of the States individually, as the
Constitution of a State may be at its individual will.39
In any case, what Jefferson and Madison wrote in 1798, in a series of resolutions
adopted by two state legislatures, cannot change the nature of the federal Constitution as
adopted in 1787: it is a binding government of the whole people of the United States. No
state may unilaterally leave the union.
C. Other Constitutional Provisions Barring Unilateral Secession
We have seen that the nature of federal sovereignty under the Constitution makes
unilateral secession illegal. Since the Constitution is a [*73] law binding the People, and
39 Rakove (1999) pp. 842-843.
not a league of states, states have no authority to intervene between the people and the
national government. If the people of a state wish to leave the union, they may not do so
unilaterally, but must obtain the agreement of their fellow citizens—or they must rebel in
a legitimate act of revolution.
Several other clauses of the Constitution are consistent with this view, and would
be inconsistent with any interpretation allowing a state to leave the union unilaterally.
The Constitution guarantees to every state a republican form of government (Art. IV § 4),
prohibits states from entering into any compact with other states without Congressional
permission (Art. I § 10), guarantees the privileges and immunities of citizens when they
travel interstate (Art. IV §2), prohibits states from entering into any “Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation,” even with Congressional approval (Art. I § 10), preserves every state’s
right to two senators (Art. V), is the supreme law of the land (Art. VI § 2), and requires
state officeholders to take an oath to support the Constitution of the United States (Art.
VI § 3). These clauses are inconsistent with the theory that secession is a constitutional
prerogative of state government. Consider, for example, the republican guarantee clause:
if a state could unilaterally secede, then any group of criminals might declare themselves
the “rightful” government of a state, issue a proclamation of secession—and then leave
the federal government unable to enforce the guarantee. Likewise, if states could leave
the union at any time, it would make little sense to require state officials to take an oath
to support the United States Constitution, since their allegiance to the federal union
would depend wholly on whether their state decided to remain in the union or not.
One common argument is that the Tenth Amendment reserves to the states the
power to secede from the union. But this claim begs the question, in two ways. The
Amendment says that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people.”40 First, since the Constitution does prohibit secession, that power cannot
be reserved to the states. And, second, the Amendment refers explicitly to “the people.”
To what “people” does this refer? Not to the people of each state separately, but to a
single people: that is, “We the People” who ratified the Constitution.41 [*74] Under the
compact theory, this clause would be surplusage, since no mere league of sovereigns has
the authority to reserve nondelegated powers directly to the people of separate
sovereignties, any more than the United Nations can “reserve” any rights to the people of
the United States.
III. Was The South Engaged In Revolution?
The fact that states have no Constitutional right to unilaterally secede does not
end the inquiry, because people retain the right of revolution regardless. If the
Confederacy represented a legitimate act of revolution, then the Union was still in the
wrong to put down the rebellion. Madison never denied that all people retain the right to
revolution. Nor did Abraham Lincoln. Even in his First Inaugural Address, Lincoln
40 Emphasis added.
41 Believers in the “strong-union” view would argue that this is the same “one people” who dissolved their
political bands with England. Also, according to one adherent of the strong-union view, one of the more
sophisticated manifestations of the pre-constitutional origin of the union is found in the fact that the
Constitution itself limits the degree to which the Constitution can be amended. No amendment, for
instance, was permitted to change the date of the Importation Clause, and no amendment can deprive a state
of its two senators. If the states had created the federal union, then these clauses would be selfcontradictory,
since there could be no higher sovereignty which could institute, let alone enforce, such a
restriction on the power to amend. “A sovereign is by definition a source and not a subject of law,” so a
compact between sovereigns can never be made unamendable. But, according to either the strong- or
weak-union views, since the whole people of the union created the Constitution only to make that union
more perfect, they could place limits on the degree to which the Constitution itself could be altered. H.V.
Jaffa, The Conditions of Freedom (Claremont: Claremont Institute Press, 2000 (1975)) pp. 161, 172.
acknowledged that “[i]f, by the mere force of numbers, a majority should deprive a
minority of any clearly written constitutional right, it might, in a moral point of view,
justify revolution—certainly would, if such right were a vital one. But such is not our
case.”42 Even though the Constitution is a compact between the whole people of the
United States, and thus is alterable by the whole people only, any individual or group
retains an inalienable right to fight against tyranny.
Many libertarians defend the Confederate states’ secession on the grounds that it
was engaged in a revolution consistent with the principles of the Declaration of
Independence. Writing in 1920, H.L. Mencken claimed that “The Union
soldiers…actually fought against self-determination; it was the Confederates who fought
for the right of their people to govern themselves.”43 More recently, Jeffrey Rogers
Hummel has written that “as a revolutionary right, the legitimacy of secession is
universal and unconditional. That at least is how the Declaration of Independence
reads.”44
The problem with this argument is that this is not how the Declaration of
Independence reads. In fact, the libertarian principles of [*75] revolution enunciated in
the Declaration do not justify the Confederacy’s acts at all.
According to libertarianism, as espoused by John Locke, Thomas Jefferson, and
others, the individual’s right to own himself puts him on a par with all other individuals
in a state of nature. Before government exists, each person has the equal right to run his
own life as every other person, and this includes the right to self-defense. Since selfdefense
is difficult in the state of nature, however, people agree to join a social compact
42 Basler (1953) 4:267.
43 H.L. Mencken, A Mencken Chrestomathy (New York: Vintage 1982 (1948)) p. 223.
44 J.R. Hummel, Emancipating Slaves, Enslaving Free Men (Peru, Ill.: Open Court, 1996) p. 351.
by delegating part of that right to the government, which is entrusted with the power to
protect their lives, liberties, and estates. But government has no authority to violate their
rights, because no individual in the state of nature has the right to violate another person’s
rights, and therefore cannot confer such a right to the government. “[T]he Legislat[ur]e,”
wrote Locke, “is not, nor can possibly be, absolutely Arbitrary over the Lives and
Fortunes of the People. For it being but the joynt power of every Member of the Society
given up to that Person or Assembly which is Legislator, it can be no more than those
persons had in a State of Nature before they enter’d into Society…. For no Body can
transfer to another more power than he has in himself; and no Body has an absolute
Arbitrary Power…[to] take away the Life or Property of another.”45 Thus, if those
appointed to govern “endeavour to take away and destroy the Property of the People, or
to reduce them to Slavery under Arbitrary Power…and…endeavour to grasp themselves,
or put into the hands of any other an Absolute Power over the Lives, Liberties, and
Estates of the People; By this breach of Trust they forfeit the Power, the People had put
into their hands, for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the People, who have a Right
to resume their original Liberty….”46 The right to revolution, therefore, is an expression
of the right to self-defense.
The right to self-ownership allows individuals to agree to a social compact, and
the right of self-defense gives that compact its legitimacy. Any society which contradicts
these fundamental premises—such as a society based on inequality and slavery—is
therefore not a legitimate government; it is instead a criminal gang, and it cannot justify
its robbery or enslavement by claiming that the people voted for these things, because the
45 Laslett (1963) p. 402.
46 Laslett (1963) p. 461.
people no right to enslave others in the first place.47 Such a “government” lacks
legitimacy and may rightly be overthrown. As Lincoln summarized it, “no man is good
enough to govern another man, without that other’s consent. I [*76] say this is the
leading principle—the sheet anchor of American republicanism.”48
The Declaration of Independence enunciates these principles in what is almost a
syllogism: “all men are created equal… endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights… among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness… to secure these
rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed… whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of
these ends… it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government….” This right
and duty, however, may only be exercised after “a long train of abuses and usurpations,
pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce [the people] under
absolute Despotism.”
The Declaration of Independence, therefore, far from recognizing any
“unconditional” right of people to overthrow their government, places several important
limits on rebellion: it is justified only by a collective act of self-defense, and even then,
only after “a long train of abuses and usurpations.” And a rebellion which institutes a
new government based not on securing individual rights, but on violating them (such as a
revolution that consists of stealing people’s property), is not a legitimate revolution at all
in the eyes of the Declaration’s libertarian theory; it would be merely a massive criminal
act or coup.
47 A. Rand, “Man’s Rights,” The Virtue of Selfishness, (New York: Signet, 1964).
48 Basler (1953) 2:266.
These arguments are all essentially rewordings of libertarianism’s famous maxim
against the initiation of force. Libertarian theory holds that political institutions are
justified only insofar as they protect the freedom of the individuals who make up that
society. A political society’s “right to self-determination,” therefore, is not a
fundamental principle according to libertarianism, but is a consequence and function of
the self-determination of individuals who make up that society.
The non-initiation of force principle means that the distinction between a
revolutionary act and a crime is that the former is a kind of self-defense, undertaken to
protect individual rights, while the latter is an initiation of force, to violate the rights of
others, or protect the proceeds of some robbery. In the former case, libertarianism holds
that it is legitimate to commit acts of physical force in retaliation against those who have
initiated its use; the American Revolution, for instance, while illegal, was a legitimate act
of revolution because Parliament had declared its right to “bind [the American colonies]
in all cases whatsoever,” and had engaged in “a long train of abuses and usurpations.”
Americans had the right to defend themselves by throwing off such government, even if
doing so cost many lives.
[*77] Analyzing the alleged “revolution” of 1861 also requires understanding the
purposes behind the act: why did the Confederacy fired on Fort Sumter, and thus violate
the supreme law of the land? Although several writers have tried to claim that the Civil
War was not fought over slavery, but over issues of domestic economic policy,49 these
49 See e.g., Livingston (2002) pp. 72-76.
claims are highly exaggerated.50 Mississippi’s declaration of secession, for example,
stated unequivocally:
In the momentous step which our State has taken…it is but just
that we should declare the prominent reasons which have induced our
course.
Our position is thoroughly identified with the institution of
slavery—the greatest material interest of the world. Its labor supplies the
product which constitutes by far the largest and most important portions of
commerce of the earth. These products are peculiar to the climate verging
on the tropical regions, and by an imperious law of nature, none but the
black race can bear exposure to the tropical sun…. [A] blow at slavery is
a blow at commerce and civilization…. There was no choice left us but
submission to the mandates of abolition, or a dissolution of the Union,
whose principles had been subverted to work out our ruin.
Domestic economic policy (other than that relating to slavery) is nowhere
mentioned in this document, or in South Carolina’s declaration of secession, which
focused only on “The right of property in slaves,” and complained that other sates “have
denied the rights of property established…have denounced as sinful the institution of
slavery…[and] have encouraged and assisted thousands of our slaves to leave their
homes.” Georgia’s declaration reiterated its “numerous and serious causes of complaint
against [the] non-slave-holding…States with reference to the subject of African slavery,”
and although it complained of the fact that Northern economic interests had received
federal protection (“they have succeeded in throwing the cost of light-houses, buoys, and
the maintenance of their seamen upon the Treasury”), it did so only to protest that federal
protection of slavery was inadequate. Texas’ declaration of secession complained that
“In all the non-slave-holding States…the people have formed themselves into a great
sectional party…based upon an unnatural feeling of hostility to these [*78] Southern
50 E. Volokh, “More on Secession And Slavery.” The Volokh Conspiracy.
http://volokh.com/2002_04_28_volokh_archive.html#76098962 (2002)
States and their beneficent and patriarchal system of African slavery, proclaiming the
debasing doctrine of equality of all men, irrespective of race or color—a doctrine at war
with nature, in opposition to the experience of mankind, and in violation of the plainest
revelations of Divine Law.”51
These documents could hardly be clearer. The Confederate states, whatever their
other reasons for seceding, were primarily moved by the desire to preserve their slave
property from interference by the federal government. Or, more accurately, in reaction
against the election of a President who had pledged himself to halt the spread of slavery
into the western territories.52 Although the Confederates phrased their arguments in
terms of “freedom,” it was the “freedom to enslave” that they were defending. Indeed,
the Constitution of the Confederate States of America, section IX clause 4,
unambiguously declared that “No…law denying or impairing the right of property in
negro slaves shall be passed.” This clause demonstrates just how off the mark
Mencken’s criticism of Lincoln really was. It was not true that “the
Confederates…fought for the right of their people to govern themselves.”53 The
Confederates fought for the (literally absolute) right of white people to govern black
people, without the black people’s consent.
Unlike present-day defenders of the South, the leaders of the Southern cause
realized that their cause could find no support in the Declaration of Independence. Thus
51 These declarations are available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/csa/csapage.htm .
52 The Constitution, of course, barred the federal government from depriving southerners of their slaves,
except possibly through condemnation in exchange for just compensation. But it did permit the Congress
to bar slavery from the western territories, which would become states eventually. If admitted as free
states, this would mean that southerners would eventually find themselves outvoted in Congress, which
could lead to the ultimate extinction of slavery. It was Lincoln’s insistence on forbidding slavery in the
west—as enunciated in his Cooper Union speech, for example—that served as the proximate cause of the
war. McPherson (1988) pp. 51-72.
53 Mencken (1982) p. 223.
they rarely based their arguments on the Declaration, and in fact explicitly denounced it.
“There is not a word of truth in it,” said John C. Calhoun.54 The principle that all men are
created equal, he said was “inserted into our Declaration of Independence without any
necessity. It made no necessary part of our justification for separating from the parent
country, and declaring ourselves independent.” Others went [*79] farther. Senator Pettit
of Indiana declared it a “self-evident lie.”55 Governor Hammond of South Carolina—
who had once said “Slavery is…the greatest of all the great blessings which a kind
Providence has ever bestowed upon our glorious region”56—denounced the “muchlauded
but nowhere accredited dogma of Mr. Jefferson that all men are created equal.”57
Contrary, then, to the oft-repeated claim that the Civil War was not about slavery,
the question of slavery answers the essential question which determines whether
secession in 1860 was an act of revolution on one hand, or a criminal conspiracy, in the
other. The secession of 1861 was not a legitimate revolution because its “cornerstone”
rested on the “the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery—
subordination to the superior race—is his natural and normal condition.”58 As Lincoln
had said before the war,
We all declare for liberty; but in using the same word we do not all mean
the same thing. With some the word liberty may mean for each man to do
as he pleases with himself, and the product of his labor; while with others
the same word may mean for some men to do as they please with other
men, and the product of other men’s labor. Here are two, not only
different, but incompatible things, called by the same name—liberty. And
it follows that each of the things is, by the respective parties, called by two
different and incompatible names—liberty and tyranny. The shepherd
54 Cong. Globe, 30th Cong. 1st Sess., p. 875 (1848)
55 Cong. Globe, 33rd Cong., 1st Sess. p. 214 (1854)
56 W. L. Miller, Arguing About Slavery. (New York: Knopf, 1988) p. 134.
57 C. Merriam, History of American Political Theories (New York: Kelly 1969 (1903)) p. 230; see further
C. Oliver, “Southern Nationalism” Reason, Aug.-Sep. 2001.
58 A. Stephens, “Cornerstone Speech” http://www.pointsouth.com/csanet/greatmen/stephens/stephenscorner.
html (1861).
drives the wolf from the sheep’s throat, for which the sheep thanks the
shepherd as a liberator, while the wolf denounces him for the same act as
the destroyer of liberty, especially as the sheep was a black one. Plainly
the sheep and the wolf are not agreed upon a definition of the word
liberty.59
The Confederacy, built upon the wolf’s definition of liberty, was an illegitimate
government by the libertarian standards of the Declaration of Independence. When the
Confederacy initiated force by firing on Fort [*80] Sumter, therefore, it became the
responsibility of the President to “take Care that the Laws [including the supreme law of
the land] be faithfully executed,”60 by putting down the rebellion by force if necessary.
IV. Why Libertarians Defend The South
Among the reasons that so many libertarians argue that the Confederacy was in
the right in the Civil War is their perception that Union victory ushered in an era of
federal expansion and control over the economy. It is certainly true that in the late
nineteenth century, the federal government intervened more and more in national
economic policy. But blaming this on Union victory is problematic at best. For one
thing, the argument partakes of the post hoc fallacy. While it is true that government
manipulation of the economy increased in the years following the war, this had many
causes, especially the rise of the Populist, and later Progressive, political movements.
These can be only distantly connected to the Union cause. Moreover, while there was
much to deplore in the culture of Yankee political economy, there was at least as much to
deplore about the culture of the antebellum south.
59 Basler (1953) 7:301-302.
60 U.S. Const. Art. II § 3.
More specifically, some libertarians argue that the Union victory caused an
expansion of federal authority by destroying the political will of states to resist the
expansionism of the federal government.61 After such a bloody experience, states were
less willing to say no when the federal government proposed to step on state prerogatives.
Although there is some truth to this argument, there are two mitigating thoughts that must
be kept in mind. First, it did not entirely destroy the will of states to resist federal
encroachment: as the Civil Rights era of the 1950s and 1960s revealed, southern states
were still quite willing to resist what they perceived as federal encroachment, through the
policy of “massive resistance” to integregation. But, secondly, that experience shows
that state resistance to federal authority is just as likely to be inimical to individual liberty
as it is to redound to the benefit of individual liberty. State resistance, after all, is usually
predicated not on protecting individuals from oppression, but on protecting the official
dignity of state governments. For libertarians to venerate state government is therefore a
risky enterprise. As Madison explained in the Federalist, the legitimacy of state
governments is only valid so long as the states protect the freedom of Americans: “is it
not preposterous,” he asked,
to urge as an objection to [the Constitution]…that such a government may
derogate from the importance of the governments [*81] of the individual
States? Was, then, the American Revolution effected, was the American
Confederacy formed, was the precious blood of thousands spilt, and the
hard-earned substance of millions lavished, not that the people of America
should enjoy peace, liberty, and safety, but that the government of the
individual States…might enjoy a certain extent of power, and be arrayed
with certain dignities and attributes of sovereignty? We have heard of the
impious doctrine in the Old World, that the people were made for kings,
not kings for the people. Is the same doctrine to be revived in the New…?
[T]he public good, the real welfare of the great body of the people, is the
supreme object to be pursued; and…no form of government whatever has
61 See e.g., W. Williams, “The Civil War’s Tragic Legacy,” Ideas on Liberty, Jan.1999.
any other value than as it may be fitted for the attainment of this object.
[A]s far as the sovereignty of the States cannot be reconciled to the
happiness of the people, the voice of every good citizen must be, Let the
former be sacrificed to the latter.62
While state resistance to federal expansion may be helpful for protecting
individual liberty, it has also often been inimical, and this was never more true than in the
case of the Civil War.
Finally, I suspect one reason libertarians are misled into embracing the
Confederate cause is because of the formative event in the lives of many libertarians, as
well as the Libertarian Political Party: The Vietnam War. The lessons that many
Vietnam protestors drew from that experience were that war is never justified, and that it
is simply “none of our business” what another country’s rulers do to the people of that
country. If the Vietnamese “choose” to live under communism, other nations must not
interfere. Likewise, this argument goes, if southerners in the 1860s chose to enslave
blacks, that may have been wrong, but it was none of the Union’s business. Seeing the
Confederacy through the lens of the Vietnam experience, however, is misleading. First,
it ignores the fact that, unlike in foreign policy, where a nation may choose whether or
not to intervene in a conflict, the Constitution requires the president to faithfully execute
the law, including the Constitution itself. Second, such a view obscures the ultimate
values of libertarian political philosophy. Although it is true that Americans do not owe a
duty to intervene when other nations’ rulers oppress their peoples, it is not true that other
nations have the right to oppress their people. To say that another nation’s oppression of
its people is “none of our business” is similar to what Lincoln described as the perverse
62 Rossiter (1961) p. 289.
notion “that ‘if one man would [*82] enslave another, no third man should object.’”63
The United States, and every other nation, does have the right, though not the duty, to
liberate oppressed peoples held captive by dictatorships. The federal government had the
right, and the duty, to put down the Confederate rebellion.
War is a terrible thing. But libertarianism holds that it is justified at times, when
undertaken in defense of individual liberty. As Jefferson said, “all men know that war is
a losing game to both parties. But they know also that if they do not resist encroachment
at some point, all will be taken from them…. It is the melancholy law of human societies
to be compelled sometimes to choose a great evil in order to ward off a greater….”64 The
Civil War was an awful conflict, costing hundreds of thousands of lives. But the right
side did prevail in that war, and libertarians should stop doing themselves the great
disservice of defending a cruel and oppressive slave society.
References
Ames, H., ed. 1911. State Documents on Federal Relations (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania).
Anastaplo, G. 2000. “John Quincy Adams Revisited.” Oklahoma City University Law
Review 25:119.
Fehrenbacher, D. 1989. Constitutions and Constitutionalism in the Slave-Holding South.
(Atlanta: University of Georgia Press).
Lence, R., ed. 1992. Union and Liberty: The Political Philosophy of John C. Calhoun
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund).
63 Basler (1953), 3:538.
64 Peterson (1984) p. 356.
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Two days ago, an e-mail about the rude treatment of Marines and soldiers returning from Iraq started making the rounds on the Internet. The brother of one of the mistreated Marines who described the incident at Oakland Airport works on the Hill. The brother forwarded the Marine’s e-mail around. The e-mail is real, contrary to the Daily Kos nut who dismissed it as “fake” without any evidence whatsoever (can you say p-r-o-j-e-c-t-i-o-n). I contacted the Marine chaplain to verify the e-mail on Friday. He confirmed.
Posted by Gunny G 
Posted by Gunny G 
Posted by Gunny G 
In 1864, former Union Army Gen. George McClellan declared the Civil War a failure, called for a peace convention that would leave slavery intact, and ran for president against President Lincoln. 
It can’t happen to you, you say? If you lived in New Orleans a couple of years ago, they took your guns without giving any reason whatsoever.
I also need at least four pistols for self defense, pistols that I actually carry on my person. 
Living in the city is no different, what with street gangs armed to the teeth with truly illegal weapons. Only the law-abiding, unarmed citizen is at risk in that environment. Recall the scene from Crocodile Dundee, wherein Mick says to the thug, “Pshaw, that’s no knife. Now this…this is a knife,” as he pulls out his foot-long blade and chases off the would-be muggers. 
Larry Pratt just brought to my attention a very disturbing piece of legislation with his article entitled 
Now that the Iraq war properly is being viewed as for the benefit of Israel, with oil being the old cynical reason, it is time to tell the full truth. America’s “War on Terrorism” is for the protection and benefit of Jews. No, not all Jews, of course, but so many that the difference is one without a distinction. That is why America, the world’s second-largest Jewish stronghold, is doing Israel’s bidding, of course. Come on, you know it is the truth. What’s more, I know you know it, even if you claim otherwise. Have some integrity and admit it.
-ed 
Buy copies of Defensive Racism - An Unapologetic Examination of Racial Differences, which extensively addresses the problems confronting America, now is available through 
He survived Iraq, only to suffer Death By Government in the “Land of the Free”: Sgt. Derek J. Hale, USMC, ret. ~ RIP 
delicious [1] | 
digg [2] | 
newsvine [3] | 
technorati [4]
Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, center, leads a Friday prayer at the Tehran University campus, in Tehran, Iran, Friday, Sept. 14, 2007. U.S. President George W. Bush will one day be tried in court just like deposed Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein for his involvement in the Iraq tragedy, said Iran’s supreme leader Friday. (AP Photo/Vahid Salemi)
Are you now willing to listen? If not, how many more innocent lives must be sacrificed on the altar of Zionism before you wake up? How many more innocent children must be murdered? How many more of your sons and daughters must die? How much more blood must be on your head before you say: “Enough?” How much?
Do you still think that America simply is defending herself against Iraq, too? Not even George Bush buys that anymore, though he has yet to give up his Administration’s doctrine of 
Already, aliens are doing the jobs of Americans sent overseas to die for Israeli hegemony, while a great many more of those jobs are about to come open, as their current occupants go off to war. Undoubtedly, a great many illegals will go, as well, lured by the promise of instant citizenship. Come on, you didn’t really think all this illegal immigration was about picking fruit, did you? Give me a better reason. I dare you. 
4. Declare all American Zionists, both Jewish and Christian, to be traitors, strip them of American citizenship and exile them to Israel. Since they love Israel so much as to subvert America to Israeli interests and desires, they should be required to live in Israel. This simultaneously will solve America’s massive media disinformation problem, too.
Who are “They?” Please, there are children present. Go rent a copy of “They Live,” then follow it up with a rewatch of “The Matrix” (ignore the sequels, which are trash) and you will understand. Then come back and ask me that question again.
